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PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION AND 
FDA GUIDANCE: A NEW HOPE 
Nathan Cortez*  
Jacob S. Sherkow** 
Assessments of a President’s first 100 days in office typically focus on 
legislative priorities and executive orders. Less attention is paid to early 
victories achieved via guidance and other informal acts of “presidential 
administration.” The COVID-19 pandemic has opened a window for the 
Biden Administration to effectuate critical public health policies through 
guidance issued by the Food and Drug Administration. This brief essay 
highlights the power—and pitfalls—of effectuating public health policy this 
way, and discusses the lasting power of guidance for any new 
administration. 
 
A President’s first 100 days in office is often marked by the Chief’s 
major executive orders and legislative priorities. Less attention is typically 
devoted to a different type of policymaking—administrative guidance, an 
important instrument of regulatory policy that details an agency’s “thinking” 
on a specific subject.1 Guidances are especially important for the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), as they constitute “the agency’s primary 
mode of policymaking.”2 In President Biden’s first 100 days, FDA has issued 
nine guidances, all final, meaning that they largely reiterated the work of the 
previous administration.3 The lack of new draft guidance belies the critical 
importance of guidances to FDA’s work—and as an instrument of executive 
policy. In an age where the Agency is routinely placed under the vise of 
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 1. E.g., Guidances, FDA (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/industry/fda-basics-industry/guidances 
[https://perma.cc/H7R9-CWMS] (“Guidance documents represent FDA’s current thinking on a topic.”). 
 2. Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 212 (2014). 
 3. Search for FDA Guidance Documents, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-
guidance-documents (last visited Apr. 11, 2021) [https://perma.cc/S8S3-DNW5]. 
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political pressure, and perhaps neglect by a gridlocked Congress, 4  the 
President has the authority to free FDA to pursue policy experiments via 
guidance.5 We argue he should do so. 
FDA is an important agency. It is the nation’s steward for public health, 
which it largely advances by interacting with—and enforcing its interpretation 
of—highly technical legal and scientific matters.6 Ideally, agencies like FDA 
craft new policies via legislative enactments or rulemaking. But the previous 
administration’s management of the Agency, combined with political stalemate 
in Congress, has made that difficult.7 By contrast, guidances, according to FDA 
staffers, “provide for quicker communication, [are] more flexible, [and] allow[ 
FDA] to communicate in a way that . . . is helpful and timely.”8 Guidance can 
relieve some pressure from congressional gridlock and may be used as an 
institutional marker to resist future political pressure, especially when such 
pressure runs counter to scientific evidence.9 Guidance thus can be a key tool of 
“presidential administration,” a president’s “public assertion of ownership of 
agency action” that persists long after the next administration has moved in.10 
So far, President Biden has done a good job of elevating science back to its 
proper, superlative place in policy discourse, including making the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy a cabinet-level office.11 But, at the time of this 
writing, Biden has yet to nominate a new FDA Commissioner, leaving potential 
gaps in the exercise of the Agency’s full power.12 Yet Congress, especially as of 
late, seems inert on matters of technical, scientific policy.13 Guidance, then, 
 
 4. See Jacob S. Sherkow, Regulatory Sandboxes and the Public Health, 2022 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 39–41), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3792217 
[https://perma.cc/Q5WX-3MUV]. 
 5. Cf. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2353 (2001) (describing 
agencies’ “need to incorporate in administrative decisionmaking the scientific, technical, and other kinds of 
professional knowledge and experience that agency officials possess” as a form of “experimentalism and 
information sharing”). 
 6. See, e.g., Advisory Committee Research Reports, and Announcements, FDA (Mar. 27, 2018) 
https://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/AboutAdvisoryCommittees/ucm165313.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5N89-RZYZ] (“The U.S. Food and Drug Administration, to assist in its mission to protect and 
promote the public health, uses 50 committees and panels to obtain independent expert advice on scientific, 
technical, and policy matters.”). 
 7. Sherkow, supra note 4, at 35–41. 
 8. Erica Seiguer & John J. Smith, Perception and Process at the Food and Drug Administration: 
Obligations and Trade-Offs in Rules and Guidances, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 17, 23 (2005). 
 9. See Kagan, supra note 5, at 2344 (suggesting that presidential oversight over rulemaking can relieve 
“political gridlock”); Sherkow, supra note 4, at 39–41 (noting this in the context of FDA emergency use 
authorizations). 
 10. Kagan, supra note 5, at 2299. 
 11. Memorandum on Restoring Trust in Government Through Scientific Integrity and Evidence-Based 
Policymaking, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-
actions/2021/01/27/memorandum-on-restoring-trust-in-government-through-scientific-integrity-and-evidence-
based-policymaking/ [https://perma.cc/79HP-FN48]. 
 12. See Michael R. Taylor, Protecting FDA’s Ability to Protect Public Health, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 805, 
808 (2006) (linking congressional oversight of FDA policy to periods of “interregnum between commissioners”). 
 13. Martha Kinsella, Congressional Science and Technology Capacity Must Be Revitalized, JUST SEC. 
(Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/68404/congressional-science-and-technology-capacity-must-be-
revitalized/ [https://perma.cc/3B84-6UKH]. 
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seems like a good opportunity both to address emerging problems and 
experiment while also putting down public and rhetorical stakes to Biden’s 
presidency.14 
This would be true even in some parallel universe where the country’s only 
major scientific policy problems were political; where a deadly pandemic was 
not sweeping the nation and claiming hundreds of thousands of lives. The 
pandemic and a slowly unfurling economic crisis are some of the best excuses 
for FDA to be aggressive in promulgating policies through guidance. COVID-
19 therapeutics and vaccines are coming online, as set against a rapidly changing 
technological landscape. 15  There is not necessarily time to build a robust 
rulemaking record for every decision FDA may encounter.16 And the Agency is 
already endowed with flexibility and discretionary authority through its 
Emergency Use Authorization program.17 Even for guidances that skirt the line 
of the Agency’s legal authority, industry, it seems, welcomes them; regulated 
firms need signals about what to expect from FDA.18 Given the speed of the 
pandemic, the absence of a Senate-confirmed Commissioner, and a less 
responsive Congress, FDA’s most frequent customers seem to recognize that 
such policies are not going to be enacted through traditional legislation or 
rulemaking.19 
But guidance can be useful beyond merely immediate and short-term ends. 
Guidance can effectively bind future administrations, particularly if the guidance 
is later codified into statute. This is not unusual; FDA policies that were first 
floated in guidance documents find their way into the U.S. Statutes at Large with 
some frequency. 20  Seen this way, guidances can be a vehicle for policy 
experimentation, subject to further refinement through experience.21 Particularly 
for dynamic technologies, guidance can be a way for FDA to test potential 
paradigm shifts in regulation.22 In 2017, for example, FDA announced plans to 
 
 14. Kagan, supra note 5, at 2299. 
 15. Sherkow, supra note 4, at 21–26. 
 16. See, e.g., id. at 23 (“For COVID-19, for example, waiting for the full completion of an ‘average’ 
vaccine clinical trial would result, at current case fatality rates, in the deaths of a staggering 20.8 million people.”). 
 17. Id. at 28–33. 
 18. Cortez, supra note 2, at 215 n.268. 
 19. Cf. Richard Moscicki, Lessons Learned from COVID-19: The Way We Develop New Medicines Is 
Changing, CATALYST (Feb. 10, 2021), https://catalyst.phrma.org/lessons-learned-from-covid-19-the-way-we-
develop-new-medicines-is-changing [https://perma.cc/4MNE-EQXL] (noting industry participating with FDA in 
crafting guidances during the pandemic). 
 20. With acknowledgement of the irony, after FDA first published a guidance document declaring several 
“Good Guidance Practices,” including notice-and-comment type procedures, Congress later codified FDA’s 
approach via statute. See Administrative Practices and Procedures; Advisory Opinions and Guidelines, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 47,314 (Oct. 15, 1992); The Food and Drug Administration’s Development, Issuance, and Use of Guidance 
Documents, 62 Fed. Reg. 8961 (Feb. 27, 1997); Food and Drug Administration Modernization and 
Accountability Act of 1997 (FDAMA), Pub. L. No. 105-115 § 405, 111 Stat. 2296, 2368–69 (codified at 21 
U.S.C. § 371(h)); see also Cortez, supra note 2, at 213.  
 21. See, e.g., Nathan Cortez, Digital Health and Regulatory Experimentation at the FDA, 21 YALE J. L. & 
TECH. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 4 (2019). 
 22. Id. at 14–19 (explaining how experiments with digital health regulation introduced under former FDA 
Commissioner Scott Gottlieb represented important departures from longstanding FDA oversight of medical 
products such as drugs and traditional devices); Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841 (2011). 
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experiment with digital health regulation, including outsourcing review from 
FDA to third parties, shifting most review from the pre-market to post-market 
phase, and focusing on firm-level indicators of quality rather than product-level 
indicators.23 Each represents an important departure from traditional medical 
product regulation.24 And none were previously contemplated by statute.25  
Of course, guidance presents its own problems. One is that initial postures 
announced via guidance can become de facto rules that are never reexamined, 
updated, or codified.26 For example, the late 1980s, in response to deaths caused 
by radiation machines, FDA published draft guidances for regulating medical 
device software.27 But the drafts were never finalized or codified, and FDA 
withdrew them without comment 18 years later.28 Thus, during a revolution in 
computerized medicine, when software became critical to patient care, FDA 
offered only tentative guidance, and thenænothing.29 The guidance became stale 
and perhaps even counterproductive. It was not until 2012 that Congress asked 
FDA to recommend a risk-based framework for regulating software.30 Failed 
guidance experiments sometimes endure.31 
And sometimes guidance can be too durableæused not as a pilot or 
precursor to lawmaking, but as a substitute. By the 1990s, FDA had become 
notable for relying more on guidance than rulemaking to advance policy, 
eventually issuing twice as many guidances as rules.32 Yet, despite being hailed 
as more “flexible” than rulemaking, 33  guidances are actually updated less 
frequently.34 Eventually, backlash against FDA’s use and abuse of guidance led 
the agency to adopt its own “Good Guidance Practices,” committing itself to 
 
 23. Scott Gottlieb, Fostering Medical Innovation: A Plan for Digital Health Devices, FDA (Jun. 15, 2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/FDAVoices/ucm612019.htm [https://perma.cc/B4WA-L6YV]. 
 24. Cortez, supra note 21, at 14–19. 
 25. Id. at 25; Letter from Elizabeth Warren, Patty Murray, & Tina Smith, U.S. Sens., to Scott Gottlieb, 
Comm’r, FDA & Jeffrey Shuren, Dir., Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, FDA (Oct. 10, 2018) 3–4, 
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2018.10.10%20Letter%20to%20FDA%20on%20regulation%20
of%20sofware%20as%20medical%20device.pdf [https://perma.cc/SD3L-FBFY]. 
 26. Cortez, supra note 2, at 216. 
 27. Draft Policy for Regulation of Computer Products, 52 Fed. Reg. 36,104 (Sep. 25, 1987); FDA Draft 
Policy for the Regulation of Computer Products (proposed Nov. 13, 1989) (on file with author); Cortez, supra 
note 2, at 191–96. 
 28. Annual Comprehensive List of Guidance Documents at the Food and Drug Administration, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 824,890 (Jan. 5, 2005). 
 29. Cortez, supra note 2, at 191–96. 
 30. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012 (FDASIA) § 618, Pub. L. No. 112-
144, 126 Stat. 993 (2012). 
 31. Nathan Cortez, Analog Agency in a Digital World, in FDA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE 
CHALLENGES OF REGULATING DRUGS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES 438 (Holly Fernandez Lynch & I. Glenn Cohen 
eds. 2015). 
 32. See Seiguer & Smith, supra note 8, at 25–26; Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and 
Informal Models of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 168 (2000); K.M. Lewis, Informal 
Guidance and the FDA, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 507, 520 (2011). 
 33. Wu, supra note 22, at 1843–48. 
 34. Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents, 119 
YALE L.J. 782, 818–19 (2010). 
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follow notice-and-comment-like procedures akin to rulemaking.35 This episode 
presaged heavy use of guidance by other federal agencies, which led to similar 
“Good Guidance Practices” imposed on executive agencies by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB).36 FDA’s guidance practice in this way became 
not so much a stamp of executive authority but a tattoo. 
Still: given the concurrent crises now facing the country, guidance presents 
the Biden Administration with a convenient but powerful tool to right the 
Agency. Guidance, if used as a tool of policy experimentationæparticularly as a 
true precursor to rulemaking or legislationæcan be an important executive tool 
for protecting public health. But making guidance work—and avoiding 
established pitfalls—requires being sensitive to guidance’s past failures, 
following FDA’s Good Guidance Practices, and ventilating policies before they 
are considered for rulemaking or legislation—whether in an administration’s 
first 100 days or its last. 
 
 
 35. Administrative Practices and Procedures; Advisory Opinions and Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,314 
(Oct. 15, 1992); The Food and Drug Administration’s Development, Issuance, and Use of Guidance Documents, 
62 Fed. Reg. 8961 (Feb. 27, 1997); 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
 36. Final Bulletin on Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432 (Jan. 25, 2007). 
